We establish the precise connections between progressive taxation and inequality reduction, in a setting where the level of tax revenue to be raised is exogenously fixed and tax schemes are balanced. We show that, in contrast with the traditional literature on taxation, the equivalence between inequality reduction and the combination of progressivity and income order preservation does not always hold in this setting. However, we show that, among rules satisfying consistency and, either revenue continuity, or revenue monotonicity, the equivalence remains intact.
"income inequality" should be reduced after taxation. 1 It has long been perceived in the literature of taxation that the two principles are closely related (see, for instance, Musgrave and Thin 1948; Fellman 1976 and Kakwani 1977) . Jakobsson (1976) was the first to notice that this relation could be stated as an equivalence, provided tax functions preserve the order of incomes. The equivalence was formally proven later by Eichhorn et al. (1984) and Thon (1987) .
In that literature, the two principles are defined as properties of a tax function, a real-valued function associating with any level of income a tax amount. This function determines the tax payment for any taxpayer in any income distribution. Thus, tax payments for any group of taxpayers depend only on their own taxable incomes, and not on others'. This imbedded property of taxation is referred to as consistency. In addition, the model has no consideration for government budget balance. These two features turn out to be essential for the above-mentioned equivalence, as we shall show later in this paper.
We investigate the two principles in a different but related model of taxation introduced by O'Neill (1982) and Young (1987 Young ( , 1988 . 2 In this model, a taxation problem is identified by a profile of incomes and an amount of tax revenue to be raised. A (tax) rule associates with each problem a profile of tax amounts whose sum equals the given tax revenue. There is no imbedded property of consistency in this definition of rules. On the other hand, rules must obey the constraint of budget balance. Thus, this model departs from the earlier model in these two important features.
We show that in this model the above logical equivalence no longer holds. In fact, inequality reduction implies neither progressivity nor income order preservation, as shown by our Examples 1 and 2. However, our main result shows that, among the rules satisfying the property of consistency and the standard property known as revenue continuity (small changes in the tax revenue do not produce a jump in tax schedules), the equivalence remains intact. The role of revenue continuity in this result can also be played by the solidarity property known as revenue monotonicity (when the tax revenue increases, no one pays less).
Model and basic concepts
We study taxation problems in a variable-population model. The set of potential taxpayers, or agents, is identified by the set of natural numbers N. Let N be the set of finite subsets of N, with generic element N . For each i ∈ N , let y i ∈ R + be i's (taxable) income and y ≡ (y i ) i∈N the income profile. A (taxation) problem is a triple consisting of a population N ∈ N , an income profile y ∈ R N + , and a tax revenue T ∈ R + such that i∈N y i ≥ T . Let Y ≡ i∈N y i . Let D N be the set of taxation problems with population N and D ≡ ∪ N ∈N D N .
Given a problem (N , y, T ) ∈ D, a tax profile is a vector x ∈ R N satisfying the following two conditions: (i) for each i ∈ N , 0 ≤ x i ≤ y i and (ii) i∈N x i =
